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Justice for Genocide in Cambodia - The Case for the Prosecution
William Smith

Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia
Phnom Penh, Cambodia
The Importance of Contemporaneous Documents and Academic Activism*

Figure 1. ECCC Case 002-01 trial in session.
Achieving justice for the genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes alleged to have
occurred in Cambodia during the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) period has not been simple. In
2006, more than 25 years after the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK or Khmer Rouge) was
ousted from power in Cambodia, ending its barbaric rule, the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) began its investigations. Its mandate was to investigate the senior
leaders and those most responsible for the crimes that occurred under the CPK. Critically, prior to
the ECCC investigations, significant investigative, archival and analytical work had been carried
out on the Khmer Rouge crimes by independent academics, researchers, journalists, investigators
and analysts working with and independently from non-government organizations (NGOs) tasked
with the same goal. Combined, these individuals and organizations have ensured that thousands of
highly probative documents produced by the CPK were preserved, early interviews with victims,
witnesses and suspects were recorded and painstaking analysis of the evidence discovered was
undertaken. This pre-ECCC work has proved invaluable, assisting the investigators and parties in
their investigation and presentation of cases, and the Chambers in their final judgments.
Today, I will highlight examples of some of this evidence that was collected prior to the
operation of the ECCC, to illustrate the importance of this substantial research and analysis on the
CPK documentation and the conduct of early interviews with suspects, witnesses and victims in
assisting in proving the prosecution cases at the ECCC.
First, I would like to put the prosecution cases in the broader factual context on which the
specific allegations against the accused at the ECCC have been made. Between 1975 and 1979, some
of the worst crimes in history were committed in DK against millions of Cambodians, when the CPK
took power after winning a five-year bloody war against the Khmer Republic government forces.
Well before coming to power, and on gaining power, the CPK leadership sought to radically and
rapidly transform Cambodian society from a capitalist feudal economy to an extreme communist
agrarian society. In the three years, eight months and twenty days that the CPK was in power, it
is estimated that at least 1.7 million people were killed through execution, overwork, starvation,
malnutrition, disease, sickness and lack of medical care. Half of these deaths are estimated to
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have occurred as a result of executions, with the other half as a result of the inhumane conditions
imposed upon Cambodians.
This radical vision was implemented through a number of CPK policies, beginning with the
forcible transfer of the population of Phnom Penh and other towns to the countryside where people
were forced to work under inhumane conditions on agricultural and infrastructure projects. These
projects were aimed at rapidly increasing Cambodia’s production and create self-reliance. As part
of this policy the CPK aimed to increase the size of the labor and defense force by forcing young
men and women to marry and have sexual relations in order to produce offspring. At the same
time, the CPK implemented a policy to persecute and kill individuals and groups they believed
opposed, or would by their inherent nature, oppose or be antithetical to their form of communist
ideology. Those targeted for persecution and killing were deemed enemies of the CPK. These
groups included those belonging to the former government or their forces, CPK members and
rank-and-file soldiers and workers that they believed were traitors, the Vietnamese (who they
viewed as lifelong enemies), the Cham Muslims (who they believed were unable to stop practicing
religion), or any other individuals that they believed possessed traits which contradicted their
socialist revolution. These included those possessing capitalist tendencies or those they believed
were connected to foreign powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union.
A consequence of the implementation of these CPK policies was the removal of almost
every fundamental human right recognized under international law. Rights such as the right to
life, physical protection, expression, speech, association, movement, family, work, leisure and
religion, among many others, were stripped from nearly every resident in Cambodia. As a result,
Cambodians effectively became slaves of the CPK for more than three-and-a-half years. Alongside
the crimes committed by the Nazis against the Jews and other minority groups in Europe during
the Second World War, the nature and duration of the crimes of the Khmer Rouge, and the number
of victims killed, raped and treated inhumanely make these crimes some of the worst in recent
history.
With such a cruel, pervasive and complete attack on the humanity of a country it is difficult
to understand why it took decades for any substantive national or international governmentsponsored judicial process to commence. There are three fundamental reasons why no such
interventions were made. First, prior to the early 1990s there was a general lack of international
co-operation and consensus on international issues, resulting from the politics of the Cold War.
Second, it was only after a unique convergence of events– the large scale systematic serious human
rights abuses being committed during the breakdown and conflict of the former Yugoslavia; the
end of the Cold War; and the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993– that the development of international criminal courts and tribunals as
a response to mass atrocities became a reality. Third, the unstable political and military situation
existing in Cambodia between the former Khmer Rouge forces and the newly formed Cambodian
government continued until the late 1990s (when the Khmer Rouge leadership finally surrendered
in full), which made it difficult to establish, investigate and bring to trial DK perpetrators.
Yet, after years of discussion between the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) and the
UN over the power sharing of the judicial process and the guarantee of fair trial standards for
any accused, to the surprise of many the ECCC finally became operational in July 2006. Everyone
recognized that, with key suspects at an advanced age, and the crimes now having occurred
decades earlier, the window for justice for these atrocities was closing fast. But importantly for
many, that window was still open.
Fortunately, in the absence of a judicial process in the preceding 25 years to bring individuals to
account for these crimes, the work of independent researchers, academics, journalists, investigators
and analysts working within or outside key NGOs filled an important void, and ensured justice
would be served for these crimes. Working independently or with organizations such as the
Cambodian Genocide Project led by Gregory Stanton, the Cambodian Documentation Program
led by David Hawk or the Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DC-Cam) led by Youk Chhang,
these individuals in many capacities undertook thousands of witness and suspect interviews,
and collected, collated, preserved, archived, copied and analyzed tens of thousands of Khmer
Rouge documents and other materials produced contemporaneously to the crimes. A number of
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these individuals wrote heavily sourced articles and books on the DK period and the lead up
to it. They were diverse individuals with a similar aim: to discover the truth of the events of the
period. Combined, they wrote in-depth analyses of the crimes that were committed, the policies
that promoted those crimes, the structure of the CPK party and the DK government, their systems
of communication, the background and activities of those most responsible for the crimes, and the
general and specific causes and motivations that led to those crimes.
The comprehensive archives and expert works produced as a result of this work have been
invaluable in arriving at the truth of the criminal allegations in the ECCC cases. Indeed, the value of
the archives was recognized by the UN Group of Experts Report which found that, based principally
on an examination of DC-Cam files, a prima facie case against select DK leaders for international
crimes could be made. In their 2004 report the Experts stated, “It is expected that the Chambers
will rely heavily on documentary evidence. Some 200,000 pages of documentary evidence are
expected to be examined. The bulk of that documentation is held by the Documentation Centre
of Cambodia, an NGO dedicated to the research and preservation of documentation on crimes
perpetrated during the period of Democratic Kampuchea.”1
The expert articles and books produced on the DK period before the ECCC investigations
started have also provided critical fast track insights into the DK period from nearly every
perspective. This would otherwise have taken years to develop. Authors such as David Chandler,
Ben Kiernan, Elizabeth Becker, Philip Short, Steve Heder and Nayan Chanda, among many others,
have provided highly informative books that have guided the parties to relevant facts in the case,
original documentation and witnesses.2 Various offices at the ECCC wisely hired some of these
experts who had researched and written extensively on this period. Experts such as Craig Etcheson,
Steve Heder, Ysa Osman, Meng-Try Ea, and a number of analytical staff from DC-Cam were
employed when the court began. These staff significantly bridged the knowledge gap between
the independent investigations and analysis done before the ECCC and the new investigation and
legal teams who did not have that specialist knowledge prior to their arrival.
Before we review some examples of key evidence that was collected by individuals working
on the DK period crimes pre-ECCC, I will outline the current status of the work of the ECCC,
particularly in terms of the trials it has conducted over the last 11 years. These trials, as a result of
the ECCC’s personal jurisdiction as described in its founding Statute, could only be of individuals
who were considered to be senior leaders and those most responsible for the crimes committed. So
the number of prosecutions was inevitably aimed to be relatively small. Consequently, since 2006,
there have been 10 individuals under judicial investigation and prosecution. Of these 10, three have
been convicted of crimes in two separate trials and some of these convictions have been confirmed
on appeal. The third trial at the ECCC, which is the second one against the accused Nuon Chea and
Khieu Samphan, has been completed, with the judgment expected in November 2018.
The first of the three trials heard was against Kaing Guek Eav, otherwise known as ‘Duch.’ He
was the officer in charge of S-21, a converted high school that became a torture and killing centre
of the CPK for most of the DK period. Here, over 12,000, and it is now alleged that over 18,000
people were imprisoned in inhumane conditions, interrogated, tortured and executed over a threeyear period. For these crimes against humanity and war crimes, Duch received a 35-year custodial
sentence with a reduction of 5 years as a result of his illegal detention prior to the establishment of
the ECCC,3 which was increased to a life sentence on appeal.4

1

United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge Trials, October 12, 2004 (UN Doc. A/59/432), para 19.

2

For example, Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy, the war after the war (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1986); Ben
Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979 (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Becker, When the War was Over: The Voices of Cambodia’s Revolution and
Its People (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); David Chandler, Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret
Prison (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999); Steve Heder, Cambodian Communism and the
Vietnamese Model: Imitation and Independence, 1930-1975 (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2004); Philip Short, Pol Pot: The
History of a Nightmare (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2004).

3

Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Trial Chamber Judgment, July 26, 2010, ECCC Case 001, Doc. No. E188, para. 631 & 632.

4

Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Appeal Chamber Judgment, February 3, 2012, ECCC Case 001, Doc. No. F28, para. 383.
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Figure 2. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch providing training to his guards at S-21 during the DK period and then
testifying at the ECCC approximately 30 years later.

Figure 3. Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea attending a CPK rally during the DK period.
The second trial was initially against four accused, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan
and Ieng Thirith. However shortly before the trial began, Ieng Thirith was found mentally unfit to
stand trial due to the onset of a severe case of Alzheimer’s disease. Then, over a year into the trial
Ieng Sary, the husband of Ieng Thirith, died from a number of conditions relating to his advanced
age of 87. After a long trial, convictions were recorded against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan
for crimes against humanity, of murder, persecution and other inhumane acts arising out of the
forcible evacuation of between two million and three million people from Phnom Penh, and others
across the countryside, in order to implement the CPK’s socialist agrarian program. Both of the
accused were sentenced to life, and despite revision of some convictions, the life sentences were
upheld on appeal.5
The third trial was against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, addressing their responsibility for
the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes occurring throughout the whole
5

Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, Trial Chamber Judgment, August 7, 2014, ECCC Case 002/01, Doc. No. E313, 622; Nuon
Chea and Khieu Samphan, Appeal Chamber Judgment, November 23, 2016, ECCC Case 002/01, Doc. No. F36, 519.
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DK period. This trial has concerned itself with the allegations of enslavement and deaths through
inhumane treatment at worksites, forced marriages and rape within those marriages, and the mass
killing of individuals across the country inside and outside CPK security centres. The charges of
genocide relate to Vietnamese and Cham Muslims living in Cambodia. The hearings of the third
trial have finished and a verdict is expected in November 2018. It was originally planned to have
one trial against the four senior leaders, however the Trial Chamber decided to sever the charges,
resulting in two trials.6 Each trial dealt with two sets of representative charges in the closing order,
ensuring that the combined impact of both trials properly represented the core types of crimes
committed in the DK period.7
The two trials of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan have been particularly large, when
measured against the time they have taken, the allegations they have covered and the evidence
admitted in support. Combined, the two trials have taken 499 days, required the questioning
of 278 individuals, 172 witnesses, 95 civil parties and 11 experts. Some 16,591 documents have
been admitted, which include contemporaneous DK materials, analytical works, audio and video
recordings, and interviews by the Co-Investigating Judges and DC-Cam. These documents range
in size from single-page DK telegrams or photographs to books of several hundred pages.
The significant length of the two trials and the sizeable amount of evidence used to support
the charges has been necessary for a few reasons. Proving crimes that occurred countrywide on
a widespread and systematic basis some three decades earlier requires a detailed and thorough
approach to the evidence both in terms of the content and volume of material collected. This
comprehensive approach is also required to prove the causal link between the most responsible for
the crimes and the perpetrators who physically committed them. To prove the link, proof is usually
required of the organizational authority structure and communication systems through which the
crimes were committed; proof of the policies that led to the commission of the crimes; and the role
and activities of those leading the organizations to which the perpetrators belong. This evidence is
often complex and difficult to obtain.
Finally, these mass atrocity cases are large due to the responsibility of the court to put the
charges in a historical context, to determine the broader causes and motivations behind the
commission of these crimes. It is essential that a society learn from its experience in order that
history does not repeat itself. Although these issues may not be specifically necessary to prove the
charges in the indictment, court findings on the broader causes and motivations behind the crimes
have the potential to educate law makers, politicians and society on what societal conditions should
be avoided in future to reduce the likelihood of similar crimes occurring again. Understanding
these factors provides a more satisfactory outcome for the victims, and gives a more complete
picture of why the crimes occurred.
I will now turn to the nature of the prosecution evidence that was used to prove the allegations
at trial. In all three trials the prosecution used evidence from multiple sources, including witnesses,
civil parties, expert and accused testimony, and statements made out of court produced by the
ECCC investigators or other individuals or agencies; CPK documentary evidence produced
contemporaneously with the crimes during the DK period, in print, photo and video form; other
contemporaneous documents produced by other governments and NGOs; forensic reports of
exhumations; books and articles. At the ECCC the Trial and Appeal Chamber has made clear,
rightly, that out-of-court statements carry less weight than in-court testimony.8
Notably, CPK contemporaneous documents and admissions by the accused in video and
print form have been extremely valuable for the prosecution in proving its case. As for the
contemporaneous documents, they do not suffer from memory loss, which can occur with a witness,
civil party, suspect or accused, particularly with the events occurring around three decades earlier.
These documents have the ability to capture accurately the precise nature of the crime, the policies
6

Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, Trial Chamber Severance Order, September 22, 2011, ECCC Case 002, Doc. No. E124, 4.

7

Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, Trial Chamber Judgment, August 7, 2014, ECCC Case 002/01, Doc. No. E313, 622; Nuon Chea
and Khieu Samphan, Appeal Chamber Judgment, November 23, 2016, ECCC Case 002/01, Doc. No. F36, 519.

8

Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, Trial Chamber Judgment, August 7, 2014, ECCC Case 002/01, Doc. No. E313, para. 34; Nuon
Chea and Khieu Samphan, Appeal Chamber Judgment, November 23, 2016, ECCC Case 002/01, Doc. No. F36, para. 296.
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that led to those crimes, the specific structure of the DK organization and systems of communication,
and the true intent of the accused and other individuals with which he or she may share the same
goals. Often in mass atrocity cases there is limited concern for self-incrimination by an individual
to hide their criminal intent, due to an often-held belief that they will never be brought to justice.
Consequently, statements written and made at the time of the crimes by perpetrators are often less
guarded than statements made when a judicial process against an individual is likely.
Fortunately for the Prosecution, large numbers of CPK internal documents were left behind in
Phnom Penh, at S-21 and a few other places, when the Khmer Rouge was forced to rapidly exit the
city due to the accelerated Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in early January 1979. Nuon Chea was
well aware of the evidentiary value of the documents left behind at S-21 when he scolded Duch, his
subordinate, in 1983 for not destroying the documents before Duch fled S-21. This comprehensive
set of documents left at S-21 became vital evidence for the prosecution more than 25 years later in
proving some of the charges against all three accused.
The types of documents left behind by the Khmer Rouge in Phnom Penh included the CPK
Party Statute, Standing Committee Meeting Minutes, Central Committee Decisions, monthly or
bi-monthly CPK policy magazines (also known as Revolutionary Flags or Youths), directives,
guidelines, orders, letters, telegrams, photographs, videos, prisoner lists and execution lists,
among others. The Revolutionary Flag and Youth magazines provided a continuous flow of the
policies and propaganda that the CPK wanted to educate all CPK members to implement in their
respective areas of responsibility. Speeches and articles pronouncing and detailing CPK policies,
some criminal, were written, authorized or agreed to by the accused and other senior leadership of
the CPK. Being able to attribute this information to the accused was important for the Prosecution.
Admissions made by the accused in recorded speeches both before, during or after the DK
regime, and admissions made in video documentaries and memoir style books produced by them
or for them, have been highly probative in proving the allegations charged. Many of these speeches
were statements transmitted over DK radio and recorded in other countries. Many were recorded
by international journalists, and many were part of documentaries made after the DK regime,
where both accused, particularly Nuon Chea, were extremely candid about their roles in and
agreement with many of the criminal policies charged, particularly the policy to kill individuals
they believed were traitors, without trial.
Expert testimony and expert books and articles written by academic scholars and journalists
have also been invaluable for the prosecution. Testimonies of authors of specialized or weighty and
extensive research works, such as David Chandler, Phillip Short, Steve Heder, Elizabeth Becker,
Kasumi Nakagawa, Peg Levine, Stephen Morris, Nayan Chanda, Ysa Osman, Alex Hinton, Craig
Etcheson and Henri Locard, among others, have assisted the Trial Chamber and the parties to better
understand the relevant evidentiary areas required to be proved or defended, and the relationship
of original documents to these areas. These writings or testimonies also provide an opportunity for
the parties to test alternative opinions both before and during trial. Experts have testified on topics
such as the operation of S-21, CPK policies, authority structure and communication systems of the
CPK, the armed conflict with Vietnam, forced marriage and the commission of genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes.
The prosecution at the ECCC has always acted with determination to ensure the maximum
amount of evidence was made available to the parties and the Trial Chamber to determine the
truth of the allegations. Where possible, the prosecution had the goal of requesting the admission,
both during the investigations and trials, of as much contemporaneous documentary evidence and
accused and other senior leader confessional evidence, along with expert opinions, as it could, in
order to support and corroborate the essential witness and civil party evidence at trial. This was to
ensure the prosecution met its responsibility to prove its cases beyond reasonable doubt. I would
like to highlight some examples of this type of contemporaneous or confessional evidence that was
used at trial to prove the charges alleged.
The first key allegation I will look at is the issue of the nature of the ideology, goals, authority
structure and communication systems of the CPK– the CPK being the one-party government
of Democratic Kampuchea. Proving these core functioning aspects of the Party enabled the
Prosecution to argue more persuasively the nature and purpose of the CPK’s criminal policies,

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.3.1658

Smith

26

Figure 4. The front page of the Statute of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.
how they were implemented and who was criminally responsible for them. The high level of
consistency of concepts and language on these issues between the CPK Statute and all of the other
evidence at trial combined, as well as CPK documents, witness, civil party, accused and expert
testimony, enabled the prosecution to argue with confidence the specific nature of the ideology,
goals, policies, authority structure and communication systems of the CPK.
The clearest and most authoritative CPK document that assists in proving the ideology, visions,
objectives, goals, duties and obligations of Party members, and the authority and communication
structure of the CPK, is the Statute of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.9 Testifying at trial,
Duch stated that the CPK Statute tendered in court was an amended version of a similar one that
he had knowledge of prior to the DK period. Although the Statute does not explicitly outline the
specific criminal policies with which the accused are charged, the Prosecution argued that by such
membership to the Party, the accused agreed to its goals, objectives, structure and obligations on
members, as outlined in the Statute.
In terms of the Party’s objectives, the Statute outlines the following, “…to continue to make
and to achieve socialist revolution in Kampuchea and to move forward toward Communism in
Kampuchea in the future [and the Party] must defend the results of the revolution and defend
and construct the country well.”10 More specifically, regarding the nature of their ideology, the
Statute indicates groups and characteristics of individuals that are likely to be in opposition to and

9

The Statute of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK Statute), 1976, ECCC Case 002 Doc. No. E3/130.

10

CPK Statute, Fundamental principles and political stances of the Party (Fundamental principles), 3.
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become enemies of the Party. It states “…[the Party] arms itself with…strong proletarian world
views and life views, absolutely struggles against non-proletarian world views and life views and
opposes the revolutions of the petty bourgeoisie, the capitalists, the feudalists, the imperialists and
all reactionaries.”11 Dealing with the concept of enemies further, the Statute places obligations on
members to actively seek out enemies as a part of the social revolution, “...[the] Party must have
high-level revolutionary vigilance towards all enemy activities and trickery, direct or indirect, overt
or secret, which have the intent to destroy the Party by every means.”12 This requirement highlights
the pre-occupation, animosity, suspicion and readiness to take action against any individual with
a different view, or aligned or perceived to be aligned, to a group that is not acceptable to the
CPK ideology. Such a requirement of Party leaders and members underpins the motivation for the
persecution and killing of suspected Cambodians and minority groups during this period.
The Statute further highlights the inflexible zealousness and speed within which CPK members
were required to implement the social revolution. It states, “[E]very member of our Party, must […]
always be on the offensive, forging himself in the heat constantly, always agitating, attacking, and
pushing constantly, inside the great, hot and deep revolutionary movement of the popular masses
and the worker peasants…making socialist revolution and constructing socialism successfully as
quickly as possible, keeping on moving forward toward Communism.”13 This rigid and absolutist
approach required to implement the CPK goals of “building” and “defending” the country
supported the arguments that the crimes which arose out of CPK central policies were committed
as a result of a system that allowed little leeway to oppose the policies imposed.
In terms of decision making, the Statute identified that the CPK leadership and members
at all levels of hierarchy made decisions in a collective manner, stating “…the Party leadership
organizations must implement collective leadership and have specific persons holding
responsibility” requiring that “various decisions of the Party must be made collectively.”14 This
principle provided an insight to the prosecution as to how decisions were made and consequently
how often decisions required agreement with more than one person. This was a relevant factor for
the Prosecution in arguing the liability of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan for criminal decisions
arising out of meetings in which they participated as part of a Committee. Based on this principle
we argued that decisions emanating from those meetings could be imputed to all who were on that
committee.
In terms of the authority and reporting structure, the Statute demonstrated that the CPK had
a strict structure and reporting system that created onerous responsibilities on each member at all
levels to fully inform their subordinates and superiors of their activities, criminal or otherwise.
Regarding the authority structure, it requires that “… [t]he minority respects the majority. Lower
echelon respects upper echelon. The individual respects the collective. The private respects the
organization. The various echelon organizations respect the central organization.”15
Regarding reporting obligations, the Statute requires “…[a]t the designated times, lower
echelon must report to upper echelon on the situation and on work done. Also at each designated
time, upper echelon must report to lower echelons regarding the general situation and regarding
instructions which they must carry out.”16 The prosecution argued that this reporting and
communication structure provided strong evidence of ordering, agreement and knowledge of the
commission of the various crimes across the country due to this inflexible top-down authority
structure and the continuous top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top communication system that was to
be enforced.
I would now like to turn to some illustrations of contemporaneous evidence and statements by
the accused that were used to prove crimes arising out of CPK policies or the accused’s participation

11

Ibid., 4.

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid., 5.

14

CPK Statute (1976), Article 6 (2), 16.

15

CPK Statute (1976), Article 6 (4), 16.

16

CPK Statute (1976), Article 6 (5), 16.
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in them. First, turning to the forced evacuations of the residents of Phnom Penh to the countryside
in the first few days of the Khmer Rouge takeover on 17 April 1975, admitted photos provided
highly probative evidence of the evacuation itself and the forced nature of it.
The photos clearly demonstrated from the air and ground the arrival of the Khmer Rouge into
Phnom Penh and the hope for a better future, then the immediate mass evacuation of the city in
the first two days of the takeover, and following this, the complete emptiness and desolation of the
city only a few days later. These photographs and videos depicted columns of people, young, old
and sick, leaving on foot or being carried under armed guard with few or no possessions, leaving
in a sea of humanity down the main roads exiting the city. The photos taken shortly after depicted
barren, wide, main streets where not a car or person could be seen. These before photos, and
the after shots of completely empty streets where not a person or car could be seen corroborated
the forced and inhumane conditions under which the population was evacuated testified to be
witnesses and civil parties. At the same time, these photos provided clear evidence of the power
and discipline the CPK leadership had over its rank-and-file soldiers to perform such an operation.

Figure 5. The evacuation of the residents of Phnon Penh when the Khmer Rouge took control of the city
in April 1975.

Figure 6. A photo taken shortly after the residents of Phnom Penh were forcibly transferred to work camps
in the countryside in April 1975.
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Contemporaneous DK documents such as the February-March 1976 edition of the CPK
Revolutionary Flag magazine confirmed the forcible nature and purpose of the evacuation,
stating, “After the liberation of the entire country, nearly 3 million people had to exit the various
cities empty-handed, without food supplies, without any means and tools at all to increase
production.”17 One of the accused, Ieng Sary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and CPK Standing
Committee Member admitted that, “The first months of the liberation were quite tough; 2000 to
3000 people died through the evacuation of Phnom Penh and several thousand died at the paddy
fields.” Khieu Samphan also admitted that he “clearly realized that the population might have
fallen along the way.”18 Other contemporaneous material such as communications from embassies
at the time and notes taken by foreign journalists present in Phnom Penh, particularly those of
Sydney Schanberg,19 all provided valuable corroboration to the victim and witness testimony of the
forced and inhumane nature of the evacuation.
Second, turning to the enslavement of Cambodians in worksites and communes across the
country, which led to the death and serious physical and psychological injury of the workers,
the video and photographic evidence brought into the courtroom the reality of the witness and
civil party testimony. The video clips showed thousands of Cambodians, including children and
the elderly working in large-scale agriculture projects under deplorable conditions. The video of
the work done on these building and irrigation projects shows the speed, discipline and arduous
nature of the work. When witnesses described suffering inhumane conditions in a number of cases
leading to the death of workers, their conclusions that they were being “treated like animals” rang
true.
The pressure under which the CPK put the workers to produce can be seen in the CPK
meeting minutes of 30 September 1976, where it is recorded that the CPK must “whip up the
mass movement, vigorously, and strictly directly on the human and material forces, in order to
accomplish the 3 tonnes per 1 acre plan and to achieve the plan to build 30% of irrigation system
countrywide.” In a speech on 15 April 1977, Khieu Samphan admitted to the size of the worksites
and the standard of living, stating that each construction site of a reservoir, canal or dam “is manned
by as many as 10,000, 20,000 or even 30,000 workers…we have no machines. We do everything by
mainly relying on the strength of our people… Though barehanded, they can do everything.”20
Later, shortly before his detention at the ECCC he admitted to the forcible nature of the work, “In
the co-operatives, the people were not free” corroborating witness testimony that they were in a
“prison without walls” in DK. 21
Third, turning to the forced marriage and rapes arising out of those marriages, photos of one
ceremony provided an insight into the circumstances under which witnesses and civil parties
described these forced marriage ceremonies. Two photos showing over 40 men and women being
married, lined up, with no emotion, in the same uniform, same haircuts for men and women, in a
bare hall with the only decoration being a large flag containing the communist symbol of a hammer
and sickle, strongly supported testimony that marriages were forced. A CPK contemporaneous
document, a Revolutionary Flag magazine dated 2 June 1975, made clear that marrying and
procreating was under the control of the CPK: “In the matter of building a family, no matter
the outcome of the Organization’s and the collective’s assessments and decisions, they must be
absolutely respected.” The forced aspect of the marriages was further confirmed by Nuon Chea
to Thet Sambath, a Cambodian journalist, when he told him: “The man always wants to choose a
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Figure 7. An excerpt from the CPK February to March 1976 Revolutionary Flag magazine where the forced
transfers of the population a year earlier are discussed.

Figure 8. A photo of Cambodians detained at work sites where they were forced to labor under inhumane
conditions.

beautiful girl, so that’s why we forced them to get married and Angkar chose he wife.”22 In the DK
period the word “Angkar” took on a number of meanings, but it was generally used to mean the
leadership of the CPK. This type of document and admission by the accused strongly corroborated
the many witnesses and civil parties from across the country who stated they were forced to marry
and have sexual relations against their will. These forcible sexual relations were charged as rape.
22
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Figure 9. A photo of two young Cambodians being forcibly married.

Figure 10. A photo of a forced wedding ceremony under the Khmer Rouge.
The driving force behind the forced marriage policy can be seen in statements of the accused
made both during and after the DK regime. On 15 April 1978, Khieu Samphan stated it was a clear
goal of the CPK at that time to “grasp firmly and implement well the plan to increase the size of the
population to its maximum, so as to have 15-20,000,000 people in the next 10-15 years.”23 Similarly,
Nuon Chea in 1981 stated that DK “has pursued a policy of increasing its population... Since 1975
Democratic Kampuchea has always required a rapid increase in its population. Thus, the four-year
23

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Phnom Penh Rally marks 17th April Anniversary, April 15, 1978, ECCC Case 002,
Doc. No. E3/562, 7.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 3 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.3.1658

Smith

32

plan of 1977-1980 aimed at increasing our population to at least 15,000,000 within 5 to 10 years.”24
Consequently, when the prosecution argued that civil party and witness testimony of forced
marriages and forced sexual relations occurring around the country were not ad hoc, but part of a
systematic central policy, these contemporaneous documents were invaluable in supporting that
argument.
Fourth, turning to the CPK policy to kill Cambodians and other groups under the façade
that the CPK was “defending the country” the Prosecution relied upon on photos, videos, CPK
documents and the accused’s own statements. Although there were many debates at trial as to
the number of killings and the purpose of the killings, ultimately the fundamental issue of the
large-scale killings of civilians and protected persons from all national, racial, ethnic, religious
and political groups boiled down to whether or not it was a legitimate exercise to kill people the
CPK suspected or believed were enemies or traitors. Nuon Chea argued that such killings were
legal and the Prosecution argued that such an argument was abhorrent, having no legal base in
international criminal law.25
One of the key documents that demonstrated the intent of the leadership to authorize the
killing of enemies without due process was a decision made on 30 March 1976 to different CPK
committees across the country. The decision delegated “[t] the right to smash [kill]…in absolute
implementation of our revolution, [and to] strengthen our socialist democracy” to the Standing,
Central, Zone and General Staff Committees located in Phnom Penh and around the country. The
clarity and absolute authority provided in this document and other similar documents promoting
the killing of enemies without trial was the reason why so many people were killed in Democratic
Kampuchea. The absolute power to kill by this decision was now distributed to delegated
authorities across the country.
One of the locations where the prosecution proved the murders occurred as a result of this
killing policy was at S-21, the torture and killing centre in Phnom Penh where at least 18,000 people
were detained and executed.
The thousands of documents left behind have been powerful not only to show that mass
killings occurred, but that they occurred as a result of policies, and those policies were created
and agreed to by the senior leadership. A full range of CPK documents were discovered at S-21.
These documents allowed the Prosecution to prove areas in the cases that not only related to S-21,
but to crimes committed elsewhere across the country. The documents assisted in proving that the
killings at S-21 were authorized by individuals at the highest level of responsibility, the nature of
the killing policies that existed, and the identity, number and type of victims killed.
For example, one of the many thousands of prisoner and execution lists found at S-21, dated
17 February 1977, recorded an instruction from Duch to his subordinate. The annotation on the list
stated; “(1) Smash: 115 (2) Keep: 23 + 21 = persons. Comrade Duch proposed to Angkar. Angkar
agreed.” This singular document, we argued, assisted in proving the death of 115 prisoners and
that a member or members of the Standing Committee ordered the killings, or were at least aware
of them.
Allegations of torture were also corroborated through the use of S-21 documents. On one
confession from S-21 the annotation stated, “Brother Duch, Here are the responses of Phoas,
given when we whipped him 4-5 times to break his stances before taking him for waterboarding.
Respectfully, Pon, 14 April 1977.” Other annotations on “confessions” of prisoners assist in
demonstrating that Nuon Chea and other senior leaders were aware of the existence of S-21 and
the interrogations, tortures and killings occurring there. One annotation on a confession stated,
“One copy sent to Brother Nuon [Nuon Chea] on 10 September 1977.” One explicit annotation by
Duch to his subordinate that appeared on a prisoner list provided highly probative evidence of the
criminal nature of S-21, where it stated, “Uncle Peng, Kill them all, Duch 30/5/1978.”
24
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Figure 11. The Central Committee Decision of 30 March 1976 delegating the authority to kill to Zone
Committees and other specialist Committees.

Figure 12. A photo of the outside of S-21 taken shortly after the Khmer Rouge were ousted from power
in 1979.
Of the approximately 189 prisons or security centres that were known to have existed during
the DK period, the prosecution in the second trial of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan concentrated
on proving the inner workings of four of them, including S-21. One of those other security centres
was a place called Kraing Ta Chan in the Tram Kak District, where many thousands of prisoners
were killed. Assisting in demonstrating the number of prisoners killed there was a document
from the prison chief that stated, “We have so far smashed 15,000 enemies. Please be informed
accordingly. District Re-education Office 105, An.”26
In any criminal case, a confession from an accused taken in unequivocally voluntary
circumstances is powerful evidence. Thet Sambath interviewed Nuon Chea for many years on
video prior to Nuon Chea arriving in ECCC custody. Thet Sambath then produced a publicly
available documentary called Enemies of the People, in which Nuon Chea makes some of the most
candid admissions as to his role, knowledge and implementation of the CPK’s killing policy.27
The documentary is full of admissions as to his role in the decisions to kill people perceived to

26
27
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Figure 13. A copy of an S-21 prisoner list where Duch provided instructions to kill or keep the detainees
for further interrogation.

Figure 14. A copy of an S-21 prisoner list where Duch instructs his subordinate, “Uncle Peng” to kill them all.
be enemies of the CPK, for example he stated, “The Party decided to kill them because they were
betraying the party and the nation. I was not scared or sad when they were killed. They had done
wrong and betrayed us, so they received the kind of treatment they deserved.” As to the lengths
Nuon Chea would take to preserve his own life and other senior leaders, Nuon Chea stated in July
1978 to the Communist Workers’ Party in Denmark, “[t]he leadership apparatus must be defended
at any price … There can be no comparison between losing two or three leading cadres and 200-300
members. Rather the latter than the former.”
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I would now like to turn to some further illustrations of contemporaneous documentary
evidence and admissions by the accused tendered to show Nuon Chea’s and Khieu Samphan’s
participation in the crimes charged. Regarding Nuon Chea, the prosecution argued that as a result
of Nuon Chea’s second most senior position in the CPK and DK, and his role and activities in
the CPK, including the creation and promotion of its criminal policies, Nuon Chea was a central
participant in a joint criminal enterprise to commit the crimes charged.

Figure 15. Nuon Chea giving a speech during the DK period and then being interviewed approximately
25 years later before he was arrested and detained at the ECCC.

Nuon Chea was the Deputy Secretary of the CPK and a leading Standing Committee member,
with this committee having the highest decision-making powers in the CPK and DK. In the Thet
Sambath documentary Enemies of the People, Nuon Chea, not denying power but in fact taking
pride in it, stated he and Pol Pot, the Secretary of the CPK, were at the same level. He said “[t] hey
just called him and me Brother Number One and Two… I was not the right arm or the left arm of
Pol Pot… We were equal. Pol Pot did not serve me and I did not serve him. We both served the
way of the Party.” As to being central to creating CPK policies and agreeing to them, Thet Sambath
wrote of the relationship between the two, “During their years in power, the two were nearly
inseparable, spending much more time with each other than they did with their families or other
leaders. Before any new initiatives were presented, Pol Pot and Nuon Chea always discussed them
together to hammer out the ideas and make sure they agreed on every point.”28 This evidence,
taken from Nuon Chea’s interviews with Thet Sambath was powerful in proving the joint criminal
enterprise between Pol Pot and Nuon Chea, the two individuals holding the highest positions in
the CPK at the time.
In terms of Khieu Samphan’s role in the crimes charged, the prosecution argued that Khieu
Samphan also worked closely with Pol Pot and Nuon Chea in his role as the DK Head of State,
his central role in Office 870 (the political and administrative committee that implemented the
decisions of the Standing Committee) and his role in the Commerce Committee. As a result of
his position, roles and activities, in these positions and the CPK more generally, the Prosecution
argued that Khieu Samphan significantly contributed to the joint criminal enterprise with Pol Pot,
Nuon Chea and others to commit the alleged crimes.
Khieu Samphan’s own admissions in his book about his relationship with Pol Pot corroborated
the other evidence at trial. Khieu Samphan wrote, “As for daily life, Pol Pot and Nuon Chea had
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Figure 16. Khieu Samphan on official duties in the DK period and then sitting in a trial session at the ECCC
approximately 35 years later.

meals with me, and we had meals together. We did nothing separately.”29 When interviewed in
a television documentary, Khieu Samphan stated that he respected Pol Pot and viewed him as
a “great leader” and said he “followed him all the time, like a shadow.”30 Becoming teary on the
video footage, he said, “I can still see him in the Cardamon Mountains, here and there. I always
keep a clear image of him in my head.”31 When asked by the interviewer if he missed Pol Pot, Khieu
Samphan answered, “Yes, because he had such an exceptional mind.”32 It was quite clear from
these videos that Khieu Samphan was in awe of Pol Pot. Such emotion and candidness is often
very difficult to obtain during the trial due to the official nature of the atmosphere and the more
circumspect approach that the accused is likely to adopt.
Khieu Samphan’s agreement with the killing policies and active participation in promoting
them can be seen in many speeches during the DK period to high-level CPK cadre from around
the country. One of those speeches at the 1978 anniversary records Khieu Samphan demanding
that cadres pledge “[t]o exterminate resolutely, all agents of the expansionist, annexationist
Vietnamese aggressors from our units and from Cambodian territory forever … To exterminate
resolutely all CIA agents… to exterminate the enemies of all stripes.”33 These contemporaneous
documents, recording statements of the accused at the time the alleged crimes occurred, provide a
valuable insight into whether or not the accused had the requisite criminal intent to commit crimes.
Similarly, Khieu Samphan’s presence at the CPK Standing Committee meetings demonstrated his
active involvement in the making and promoting of CPK policy.34
I would like to come back to the importance of the role of independent academics, journalists,
analysts and other individuals in the investigation of the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge
in the judicial process at the ECCC. These early inquirers devoted significant parts of their lives to
ensure those most responsible were brought to justice at a time when the international community
and the Cambodian government were unable to do so. One such person was Alex Hinton who
came to the Prosecution’s attention in 2006 as a result of a book he published entitled Why Did
29
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Figure 17. Minutes of CPK Standing Committee meeting on 8 March 1976, indicating that both Nuon
Chea and Khieu Samphan attended.
They Kill?35 The theme and research of this book addressed the question of why mass killings
occurred during the Khmer Rouge period. The book was based on comparative genocide research
and a specific study of the alleged genocide and crimes against humanity occurring in Cambodia.
In any criminal case, national and international, it is not required for the prosecution to prove
the motivation behind a perpetrator’s crime, as opposed to the necessity of proving the intent
to commit the crime. Often these two concepts are closely connected but nonetheless they are
distinct. However, despite the fact that Alex Hinton’s book had highly probative evidence of crimes
being committed from first-hand interviews with victims and perpetrators and valuable opinion
evidence on how CPK language was used to incite killings constituting genocide and crimes against
humanity, among other matters, his book came under close attention for another important reason.
In his book, Alex Hinton sought to identify and understand why individuals at the highest
and lowest levels of the CPK and DK structures would persecute and kill Cambodians, and other
groups such as the Cham Muslims and Vietnamese. Such information would be valuable for the
legacy of the court, so Cambodian society and the international community could learn from this
experience.
Consequently, in the second trial against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, in which the
genocide and crimes against humanity charges based on mass killings around the country would
be heard, the Prosecution requested that Dr. Hinton be called. We wanted the judges and the public
to hear an objective analysis of how the mechanics of genocide worked so that the facts in the case
could be better understood.
As Alex Hinton testified he demonstrated that his extensive academic career, voluminous
publications, and leadership positions held in the area of genocide studies amply enabled him to
be classified as an expert on issues such as the cause of the genocide and persecution in Cambodia.
As he did in his book, Dr. Hinton gave an articulate and comprehensive account of the societal
factors that created conditions for killings on a massive scale and other acts of persecution to occur
in Cambodia. He explained to the judges the universal and uniquely Cambodian societal factors
that existed both before and during the DK period, which caused the genocide and crimes against
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humanity to occur.36 It was clear in the courtroom that the judges concentrated on every word of
his testimony, as he approached the evidence from a macro and micro perspective to explain how
these killings took place so systematically.
Dr. Hinton also testified on the information he received first-hand from hundreds of witnesses,
who included former Khmer Rouge cadre and survivors who provided evidence of the existence
and implementation of the CPK policies to kill specifically Cham Muslims, Vietnamese and other
groups. These interviews were conducted in Kampong Cham province in the mid-1990s as part of
Alex Hinton’s research for his PhD.
A significant part of Dr. Hinton’s testimony concerned one aspect of the CPK documents
that was being argued as evidence of intent to commit genocide of the Vietnamese. This evidence
was identified in the language used by the CPK in their leaders’ speeches, publications, and other
documentation. For example, in the April 1978 Revolutionary Flag magazine, the CPK acknowledges
their “success” in eradicating the Vietnamese from Cambodia, stating “[a]nd now, how about the
Yuon? There are no Yuon in Kampuchean territory. Formerly there were nearly 1,000,000 of them.
Now there is not one seed of them to be found.”37 Alex Hinton testified that language used in this
way in CPK documents was done intentionally to incite subordinates to commit genocide against
the Vietnamese.38
On the last day of Dr. Hinton’s questioning, his testimony on this issue caught the close
attention of Nuon Chea to such an extent that he requested to be brought up to the courtroom in
order to make a statement in response to the expert’s opinion. It was very rare that Nuon Chea
came into the courtroom, preferring to watch the proceedings in an adjacent room on video due
to his health conditions. After a statement by Nuon Chea, in which he said he believed the word
‘Youn’ was not derogatory towards Vietnamese, Dr. Hinton responded respectfully, “I think that’s
a valuable pedagogical exercise in general, but in the end I stand strongly by my stance that the
word ‘Yuon’ can be a very incendiary word. It’s a word that can incite hatred and violence and in
the context of DK it was an incitement to genocide.”39
Sitting at the prosecution bench as this exchange was unfolding, I watched Dr. Hinton ably
and respectfully respond to Nuon Chea’s view. I thought to myself, would Alex Hinton ever have
thought that, when he was that 31-year-old PhD research student sitting in a village in Kampong
Cham province in the middle of Cambodia collecting evidence on the genocide of the Khmer Rouge,
that 25 years later he would be discussing his findings with Nuon Chea in a trial where Nuon Chea
was charged with genocide on the very facts he was investigating? Being in this position clearly did
not intimidate Dr. Hinton. To the contrary, in court he held his resolve to keep his mind trained on
the topic and bring to the fore all of the facts to support his opinions under heavy questioning and
the opinion of Nuon Chea himself. All Dr. Hinton’s prior hard work had paid off, and he was able
to make his contribution to the accountability and reconciliation process in Cambodia in one of the
most salient ways possible.
The title of this address was Justice for Genocide in Cambodia – The Case for the Prosecution.
However, I aimed to steer my remarks to acknowledging the importance of independent
academics, journalists, researchers, investigators, analysts and NGOs that take the difficult,
dangerous and often thankless course of investigating and analyzing mass human rights abuses
when the international community is unable to do so. Without these efforts, important evidence
is easily lost, documents are destroyed, opportunities for incisive interviews are gone, witness
leads are buried, and the chance to deliver justice decreases by the year. If not for the work of these
individuals, independently or together, prior to the establishment of the ECCC, seeking justice for
the Khmer Rouge crimes would have been extremely difficult. This activity by these individuals
and organizations provides a good lesson to all of us to keep seeking justice for others, even when
it feels like nothing will ever be done.
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